Bharatham has long been the country with the greatest influence over Sri Lanka but its policies to encourage the government there towards a sustainable peace are not working. Despite India’s active engagement and unprecedented financial assistance, the Sri Lankan government has failed to make progress on pressing post-war challenges. Government actions and the growing political power of the military are instead generating new grievances that increase the risk of an eventual return to violence. To support a sustainable and equitable post-war settlement in Sri Lanka and limit the chances of another authoritarian and military-dominated government on its borders, India needs to work more closely with the United States, the European Union and Japan, encouraging them to send the message that Sri Lanka’s current direction is not acceptable. It should press for the demilitarisation of the north, a return to civil administration there and in the east and the end of emergency rule throughout the country. Most important Tamilnadu politics, and do not attempt to use its party politics in Srilankan internal matters ..
Opinion
02/06/2018
1258
Sub :-
Bharatham has long been the country with the greatest influence over Sri Lanka but its policies to encourage the government there towards a sustainable peace are not working. Despite India’s active engagement and unprecedented financial assistance, the Sri Lankan government has failed to make progress on pressing post-war challenges. Government actions and the growing political power of the military are instead generating new grievances that increase the risk of an eventual return to violence. To support a sustainable and equitable post-war settlement in Sri Lanka and limit the chances of another authoritarian and military-dominated government on its borders, India needs to work more closely with the United States, the European Union and Japan, encouraging them to send the message that Sri Lanka’s current direction is not acceptable. It should press for the demilitarisation of the north, a return to civil administration there and in the east and the end of emergency rule throughout the country. Most important Tamilnadu politics, and do not attempt to use its party politics in Srilankan internal matters ..
India-Sri Lanka Relations: Everything You Need to Know -
Sree Resmi S
Sri Lanka is India’s closest maritime neighbor and is just 30 nautical miles away from the territorial boundary. India has deep historical and cultural ties with this island nation. In this post, we analyze the areas of co-operation between India and Sri Lanka. You can also learn about the major issues between the two nations.
I.Background of Sri Lanka and History of Civil War :-
*Tamils and Sinhalese are the two major ethnic groups In Sri Lanka. Sinhalese eternal conflict with Tamils for power had been gathering strength since before independence.
*Many Tamils attended English language schools which were the passport to higher education and better employment in the colonial period. And the Tamil-dominated Northern Province had comparatively better facilities in terms of education and employment.
*Post independence Sinhalese nationalism sought to curb the Tamil presence in education and civil administration. In 1949 Indian Tamil plantation workers disenfranchised, the start of a wave of Sinhalese nationalism which alienates the Tamil people in the region.
*The passing of the infamous “Sinhalese Only Bill” in 1956 was an another attempt in the same lines.
*The constitutional provisions in the 1972 Constitution favoring the Sinhalese language and Buddhist religion, along with their educational policies convinced many Tamils that they had been perceived as a marginal community.
*As a result of open discrimination, in 1976 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed to fight for Tamil rights and in 1983 Civil war started.
II.India’s role in Civil war and its implications :-
1.India-Sri-Lanka Relations :-
*The bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka deteriorated in 1980’s with a rising of the Tamil militant separatism in Sri Lanka.
*In 1987 with the objective of improving the ties, Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed between India and Sri Lanka.
*It proposed a political solution to the Sri Lanka’s conflict by establishing a provincial council system and devolution of power for nine provinces in Sri Lanka. (This is popularly known as The Thirteenth Amendment (13A) to the Constitution of Sri Lanka)
*India also deployed Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka intended to perform a peacekeeping (It is known as Operation Pawan, which ultimately resulted in the assassination of PM Rajiv Gandhi).
*After two years of constant military engagement, the IPKF was withdrawn as it failed to defeat LTTE.
*Finally, in 2009, 25 years of violence ended when Sri Lankan government seized the last area controlled by Tamil Tiger rebels. India at that point of agreed to reconstruct the war-torn areas and started many rehabilitation programs.
*However, the pro-LTTE governments in Tamil Nadu influenced the decisions of Central Government which posed a roadblock in humanitarian assistance in Sri Lanka.
*Also, the relationship started deteriorating when India voted against Sri Lanka in 2009, 2012 and 2013 at the US-sponsored UNHRC resolution to investigate alleged human rights violations by the state against the Tamil rebels.
III.India-Sri Lanka Relations: Areas of cooperation :-
"The cultural and trade ties between Sri Lanka is very strong."
1. Cultural Relations :-
i. India-Sri-Lanka Cultural Relations :-
*The People of Indian Origin (PIOs) comprise Sindhis, Gujaratis, Memons, Parsis, Malayalis and Telugu speaking persons who have settled down in Sri Lanka and are engaged in various business ventures.
*Though their numbers (10,000 approx.) are much lesser as compared to Indian Origin Tamils (IOTs), they are economically prosperous and are well settled. Each of these communities has their own groups which organize festivals and cultural events.
*The Cultural Cooperation Agreement has been signed between both the countries.
*The Indian Cultural Centre in Colombo actively promotes awareness of Indian culture by offering classes in Indian music, dance, Hindi, and Yoga. Every year, cultural troops from both countries exchange visits.
*Buddhism is a connecting link between India and Sri Lanka on religious lines.
*Education is another important area of cooperation between India and Sri Lanka. India offers scholarship slots annually to deserving Sri Lankan students.
*Tourism also forms an important link between India and Sri Lanka. India is the largest source of market for Sri Lankan tourism.
2. Trade Relations :-
i. India-Sri-Lanka Trade Relations :-
*Sri Lanka is India’s second largest trading partner in SAARC.
*India and Sri Lanka signed FTA in 1998, which facilitated increased trade relations between the two countries. Sri Lanka has long been a priority destination for direct investment from India. India is among the top four investors in Sri Lanka with cumulative investments of over US$ 1 billion since 2003.
*Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreement (ETCA): The proposed ETCA between India and Sri Lanka would facilitate trade in services, investments and technological cooperation. With ETCA signed, Indian investments will flow into Sri Lanka to make the island’s production facilities part of the Indian and international value chain.
IV. India-Sri Lanka: Issues and Conflicts :-
"There are a few areas over which there is minor contention between India and Sri Lanka."
1. Strategic Issues :-
*In the period of low profile relationship between the two nations, SL apparently started favoring China over India.
*Over the years Chinese funds started flowing, it has started big buck infrastructure projects in the island nation. The presence of China in Sri Lanka increased significantly in the recent years.
*As part of Maritime Silk Route (MSR) policy, China built two ports, one in Colombo and another in Hambantota.
*China has also collaborated in satellite launching activities with Supreme SAT (Pvt.), Sri Lanka’s only satellite operator.
i. India’s efforts to counter China :-
*In 2014 India abstained from voting on a UNHRC resolution calling for a probe into alleged war crimes by Sri Lanka. And it helped to revamp the century-old relationship with Sri Lanka. (While Pakistan and China voted against the resolution)
*In a sign of a closer strategic partnership between Sri Lanka and India, they signed civil nuclear cooperation agreement which is Sri Lanka’s first nuclear partnership with any country.
*In the wake of China’s economic dominance in the island, India is also entering into Sri Lanka’s mega project business in a big way by focusing on infrastructure development in the Northern and Eastern provinces.
*India is also planning to build Trincomalee Port. The port is envisioned as an Indian counterweight to Chinese developments at Hambantota Port.
ii. Fisherman Problem :-
Fishing disputes have been a constant area of concern between the two South Asian neighbors for a long time. Sri Lanka has long expressed concerns about illegal fishing by Indian fishermen within its territorial waters across the Palk Strait. The country regularly arrests Indian fishermen for crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) that demarcates Indian and Sri Lankan waters. India also detains Sri Lankan fishermen for the illegal fishing.
iii. Katchatheevu Island :-
*It is an uninhabited island that India ceded to Sri Lanka in 1974 based on a conditional agreement called “Kachchativu island pact”.
*Later on, Sri Lanka declared Katchatheevu, a sacred land given the presence of a Catholic shrine
*The central government recognizes Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over the island as per the 1974 accord. But Tamil Nadu claimed that Katchatheevu falls under the Indian territory and Tamil fishermen have traditionally believed that it belongs to them and therefore want to preserve the right to fish there.
V. Conclusion :-
India shares a common cultural and security space with the countries in the South Asian region especially Sri Lanka. As a prominent Asian nation with critical national interests in South Asia, India has a special responsibility to ensure peace and stability in its closest neighborhood. India should shed its big brother image and actively take part to rebuild the war-torn country.India needs the support of Sri Lanka to emerge as a Blue water navy in the Indian Ocean and also in pursuing the permanent membership in United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Therefore, the two countries should recognize the legitimacy of each other’s concerns and operate in a way which is mutually beneficial.
NOTE :-
New Delhi’s relations with Sri Lanka have had four main priorities : -
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*providing humanitarian assistance to displaced Tamils in the north and east;
*supporting major development projects, primarily in the north, with concessionary loans;
*pressing the Sri Lankan government and the main Sri Lankan Tamil political alliance, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), to work towards a negotiated settlement of ethnic conflict
through the devolution of power to Tamil-majority areas in the north and east; and
*encouraging greater economic integration between the two economies.
1.
India’s approach has so far paid only limited dividends. Deepening militarisation and Sinhalisation in the northern province have increased the insecurity and political marginalisation of Tamils and are undermining prospects for inter-ethnic reconciliation. The government continues to resist any investigation or accounting for mass atrocities in the final months of the war. Democratic governance is under sustained assault throughout the country, as power is concentrated in the president’s family and the military; attacks on independent media and political opponents continue with impunity. Even on Indian-sponsored development projects and economic integration, the Sri Lankan government has dragged its feet; for example, construction has begun on only a handful of the 50,000 houses India has offered to build in the northern province.
2.
While officials in New Delhi admit they are frustrated, India remains hesitant to press President Rajapaksa’s regime very hard. This is due in part to its history of counter-productive interventions in Sri Lanka. India’s misguided policy of arming Tamil militants in 1980s significantly expanded the conflict, and its decision to send peacekeepers to enforce the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord ended in disaster as the LTTE fought them to a standstill and later took revenge by assassinating former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. India’s interventions have made Sri Lankans of all communities suspicious, limiting India’s room for manoeuvre. Many Sinhalese see India as favouring Tamils and as wanting to weaken or divide the country, despite its crucial role in destroying the Tamil Tigers. For many Tamils, on the other hand, India is seen as having repeatedly broken its pledges to defend their rights and protect their lives, especially during the final phase of the war in 2009.
3.
India’s reluctance to put serious pressure on the Sri Lankan government is also due to strategic considerations, in particular its desire to counter the growing influence of China, whose financial and political support the Rajapaksa government has been cultivating. India’s own growing economic interests in Sri Lanka have also tempered its political activism. New Delhi’s traditional reluctance to work through multilateral bodies or in close coordination with other governments – due in part to its fear of international scrutiny of its own conflicts, particularly in Kashmir – has also significantly weakened its ability to influence Sri Lanka.
4.
India, nonetheless, has strong reasons to work for fundamental changes in Sri Lanka’s post-war policies. It has a clear interest in preventing either a return to violent militancy or the consolidation on its borders of another authoritarian government with an overly powerful military. India’s own democratic values and successes in accommodating ethnic diversity should also encourage an activist approach, especially as it seeks recognition as a rising global power with hopes of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. India’s own restive domestic Tamil constituency, to which the central government needs to respond for electoral considerations, is pressing for stronger action. After decades of actively supporting minority rights and devolution of power in Sri Lanka, India has its reputation on the line. With the much-hated LTTE defeated with Indian assistance, New Delhi should, in principle, have more leeway to push for reforms.
If it is serious about promoting a stable and democratic Sri Lanka, India will have to rebalance its priorities and press more consistently and in concert with other powers for major political reforms in Sri Lanka. Parties in Tamil Nadu, in turn, will need to use their leverage with New Delhi in consistent and principled ways, even at the risk of sacrificing potentially profitable political deals.
6.
"India’s support for negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil National Alliance, which belatedly began in January 2011, has been useful and should be maintained. But the immediate focus of the talks and of Indian influence should shift from pressing for effective devolution of power to demilitarising the north and east and rebuilding meaningful democratic institutions and freedoms."
This would require : -
*re-establishing the authority of the local civil administration in the north and east to oversee development and humanitarian assistance without interference by the military or central government;
*holding the long-delayed election for the Northern Provincial Council;
*publicising the names and locations of all those detained on suspected involvement with the LTTE (including those in “rehabilitation” centres);
*expediting the release of land currently designated as (or operating as de facto) high-security zones; and
*removing arbitrary restrictions on political activities and on the humanitarian activities of local and international NGOs.
8.
India should monitor its projects in the north more closely and insist, along with other donors, that they effectively empower local people. India should insist on working through the newly elected local governments and, eventually, with the Northern Provincial Council. To make this possible, India will need to coordinate more closely with Japan, Western donors and international development banks. Together they have the political and financial leverage to influence the Rajapaksa administration should they choose to use it. India should revive its idea of a donors conference to review post-war progress and to push the government to demilitarise the north, lift the state of emergency and relax anti-terrorism laws.
9.
In New York, Geneva and Colombo, India should publicly acknowledge the importance and credibility of the report by the UN Secretary-General’s panel of experts on accountability and should support an independent international investigation into allegations of war crimes at the close of the civil war in 2009. At the same time, it should send strong, public messages to the Sri Lankan government on the need for domestic action on accountability. It should also work towards the establishment of a truth commission that would examine the injustices and crimes suffered by all communities, including those committed by all parties during the Indian army’s presence in northern Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. Acknowledging the suffering of all communities will be necessary for lasting peace.
10.
India should broaden its political agenda from focusing solely on devolution and ensuring the rights of Tamils. Without a reversal of the Sri Lankan government’s growing authoritarianism, centralisation of power and continued repression of dissent, any devolution will be meaningless and the risks of renewed conflict will increase. India’s longstanding interest in a peaceful and politically stable Sri Lanka is best served by strong messages to Colombo to end impunity and reverse the democratic decay that undermines the rights of all Sri Lankans. By raising political concerns that affect all of Sri Lanka’s communities, India can also counter suspicions among Sinhalese and eventually strengthen its hand with the government. This will take some time, but the work should start now.
*Media Reports :-India and Sri Lanka - LTTE
I.
Late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Sri Lankan strategy was a mixture of contradictions. It reflected Cold War calculations, rather than purely Indian strategic compulsions. The LTTE’s war to create a separate state for Tamils called Eelam proved a handy tool for Indira to work India into a role in Sri Lanka, but her mistake was to presume she could manage the conflict without letting it get out of hand.
In the 1980s, India and Sri Lanka belonged to separate Cold War camps, with the former aligning with the now splintered Soviet Union and the island nation with the US. Though India under Indira did not share bad vibes with the Lankan leadership, it was an uneasy relationship to some degree.
Indira took active interest in resolving the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, yet she also provided training to rebel Tamil youths. The Indian government convened a meeting of both sides in the ethnic conflict at Thimpu in Bhutan to thrash out a solution. While playing big brother, it also allowed the LTTE and other militant groups to set up base in Tamil Nadu. Tamil separatists received funding and weapons from private sources as well.
In an exclusive interview to VK Shashikumar of Mediagrove, LTTE leader Kumaran Pathmanathan (“KP”), who is now in Sri Lankan custody, says that India started training the Tamil rebels in the early 1980s around the time when peace talks were floundering
“The talks were called Thimpu talks (held in Bhutan). But the talks failed. Around that time the Indian government gave (military) training to Tamil youths. So we (LTTE) had a base in Tamil Nadu. We had a (military) base in India. All the four Tamil (militant) groups, very strong groups, were trained and armed by India. Like I told you, that was the Cold War period and the international environment was such.”
What was Mrs Gandhi’s gameplan in training the Tamil groups? According to KP, “During that time it was Mrs Gandhi’s idea that she may be able to escalate LTTE’s armed struggle to a certain level and use that as negotiating leverage to settle the (Tamil) issue in a peaceful way. Unfortunately, she was gone (assassinated in 1984).”
In the final analysis, Mrs Gandhi’s decision to play with fire ended up scorching her own son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi. She herself went down to bullets fired by her own bodyguards – both strongly influenced by Sikh extremists taking revenge for “Operation Bluestar,” when the Indian Army entered the Golden Temple to flush out Sikh militants.
KP also says that the LTTE’s ties with India started souring around the time Rajiv Gandhi came into the picture. “He (Rajiv) was a modern leader and he was very fast (with decisions). His approach was different. By then RAW (Indian spy agency Research & Analysis Wing) was heavily involved with all the Tamil groups. It was at that time that a misunderstanding between Prabhakaran and RAW started.”
KP does not say what the misunderstanding was, but obviously the LTTE had developed a wariness about Indira and her son Rajiv well before the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord to send in the IPKF was signed.
He says: “Sri Lankan President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi tried to sort it out. But again LTTE did not accept the proposals. Rajiv Gandhi pushed (for it) and so LTTE reluctantly came to an agreement (referring to the India-Sri Lanka Accord). But actually LTTE rejected the agreement (internally).”
So much for India's involvement with the militant movement in Lanka, but was the reverse also true? Was the LTTE also training the Maoists in India to take on the state? KP says it wasn't the case as long as he was at the helm.
II.
DMK ideology was a factor in Rajiv's assassination by LTTE :-
Everybody knows that Velupillai Prabhakaran, slain chief of the dreaded Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), had organised the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in the early 1990s. Everybody also assumed that he was killed because he had sent in the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to end the armed struggle and enforce a solution to grant Tamils autonomy in a federal Sri Lanka.
But few know that Prabhakaran’s hatred for Rajiv also had some ideological roots in the radical anti-Brahmin movement in Tamil Nadu started by EV Ramasamy Naicker (Periyar), who started the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK) movement in the first half of the 20th century. The DK is the intellectual parent of the DMK and other Tamil parties formed after independence.
The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by LTTE did not augur well for the group. Reuters
According to Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), the current head of the LTTE, whom VK Shashikumar of Mediagrove interviewed recently, Prabhakaran hated Rajiv Gandhi. While a large part of this hatred emanated from the former Indian Prime Minister’s quick-fix approach towards the complex Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka (which included sending in the IPKF), some of it was also the result of the DK’s ideology that Prabhakaran had imbibed.
The role of Prabhakaran in the assassination is well-known, but a frank admission of the fact from the organisation's top brass has so far been elusive. Now, we get it from KP, chief arms procurer of the LTTE in its heyday, now in Sri Lankan custody after his capture in 2009. Firstpost is the first online publication to carry KP’s first-ever video interview to Mediagrove.
Those who were involved in Rajiv’s murder were from the LTTE’s intelligence wing. The conspiracy was hatched by "Prabhakaran and his intelligence chief Pottu Amman", KP says. However, he adds a new spin to the former LTTE chief’s animosity towards Rajiv: the lingering influence of Dravidian ideology on LTTE chief’s views.
According to KP, the "Dravida Kazhagam, which has been there for 100 years, even after Periyar is gone, is still passing on its ideas to (people like) Prabhakaran, especially anti-Brahminism. Prabhakaran’s idea was to struggle against the Brahmins. Because of this (DK background), Tamil Nadu politicians made a marvelous hero out of Prabhakaran. They compared him to old Tamil Kings, and his colour changed. That’s why he made this blunder against Rajiv Gandhi."
When asked specifically if the DMK’s ideology played a role in the murder of Rajiv, KP demurs. “This I cannot say yes, but you know that influence…they (Tamil politicians) fed him against the Brahmins. That’s why he hated the Prime Minister of India.”
III.
How DMK & Vaiko used Eelam for their own political ends :-
Most leaders apparently used the Sri Lankan Tamil issue to buttress their own political claims in the state, where there was sympathy for their suffering brethren across the Palk Straits.
Whether it was DMK leader M Karunanidhi or V Gopalswamy (Vaiko), who heads the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), all of them used the Lankan Tamils card when it suited them. In an interview to VK Shashikumar of Mediagrove, his first since the war ended in May 2009, KP says: “Vaiko, some DMK MPs and MLAs were very close to us. Karunanidhi is a senior politician but he also used this (LTTE) card from time to time…(he wanted to say) ‘I am close to Prabhakaran’ because that will get him the vote. They are a well off party, but they only need votes.”
In the initial stages, the militant groups fighting the Sri Lankans did not have much need to engage with Tamil Nadu politicians, but once Prabhakaran and another extremist leader Uma Maheswaran fought each other in public on Indian soil and went to jail, they needed political help. Says KP: “When we started our struggle, it was very clean. We did not involve Indian politicians…The problem was when we first met politicians in Tamil Nadu – for example when (LTTE chief) Prabhakaran and Uma Maheswaran fought on the streets of Tamil Nadu and were put in jail – we sought the help of politicians to get bail. That was the start of Tamil Nadu political influence…”
Why did Vaiko suddenly land up at Prabhakaran’s lair in Sri Lanka during the war? KP’s answer: He came with a “personal agenda.” Vaiko wanted to succeed Karunanidhi as DMK head, but the latter’s son Stalin was also in contention. To establish his own space, Vaiko “wanted to gain popularity on the basis of LTTE…He wanted the LTTE’s support, since Tamil Nadu people are emotional, and they were behind the LTTE…He (Vaiko) even violated the law and came here and met Prabhakaran.”
KP says that Prabhakaran was surprised that Vaiko came to meet him without Karunanidhi’s knowledge.
On Jayalalithaa, KP spoke diplomatically about her saying she was a smart lady who knew her mind. Jayalalithaa gets Z category security in Tamil Nadu apparently because the LTTE wanted to get her at some point of time. Was this true? KP seemed to suggest that she could have been a target because she was no friend of the LTTE. “She feels that (she was on the hit-list). Maybe if the LTTE got the chance they may have tried (to kill her), because she was always against LTTE…she always took action against the LTTE.”
So what are KP’s current expectations from the politicians of Tamil Nadu. His basic message: keep politics out, and focus on lending a helping hand to feed the poor among Sri Lankan Tamils. He wants Jayalalithaa to get industry to create factories and jobs in northern Sri Lanka, where the Tamil population is concentrated.
IV..
Nitin Anant Gokhale, NDTV's Defence and Strategic Affairs Editor, has been reporting on military affairs and militancy from hostile terrains like India's north-east, the Kashmir valley and the Naxal heartland.
His latest book Sri Lanka: From War to Peace is based on his reportage of the 33-month civil war in Sri Lanka. Gokhale chronicles the details of an unprecedented military campaign by the Sri Lankan armed forces and analysis the reason for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's decline.
In this exclusive excerpt, he details how the Indian government, bound by domestic political compulsions, covertly helped the Sri Lankan army and navy to scour out and destroy the LTTE.
By the end of November 2008, the script was no longer in LTTE chief Vellupillai Prabhakaran's hands.
It was being written by the Sri Lankan forces tacitly supported by India and openly assisted by China and Pakistan.
Since December 2005, when Mahinda Rajapaksa made his first visit to New Delhi less than a month after he took over as Sri Lanka's president, India was aware of his intention to take the LTTE head on.
Although in the initial days he was advised to seek a negotiated settlement with the Tigers, New Delhi saw merit in Rajapaksa's argument that the LTTE was only biding its time to regroup and rearm itself and that war was inevitable sooner than later.
And if the LTTE was preparing for a showdown, Rajapaksa did not want to be caught off guard either. His armed forces needed to be ready for any eventuality.
The president therefore sent his brothers Basil and Gotabaya to New Delhi with a shopping list for essential weapons and equipment that the Sri Lankan armed forces needed. The shopping list included air defence weapons, artillery guns, Nishant unmanned aerial vehicles and laser designators for precision-guided munitions.
Initially, New Delhi was non-committal.
Top officials involved in the talks on either side told me that in its typical bureaucratic style, New Delhi neither said yes nor said no to the visiting Sri Lankans. So the two brothers went back slightly disappointed but were still hopeful of getting Indian help.
Outwardly, India did adopt a hands-off policy vis-a-vis the Sri Lanka conflict. But that was because of domestic political compulsions born out of the fact that the ruling United Progressive Alliance government in New Delhi was dependent upon the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party from Tamil Nadu for its survival in Parliament.
Aware of DMK chief M Karunanidhi's soft corner for Prabhakaran, the UPA did not think it politically prudent to annoy the DMK patriarch by openly supporting the Sri Lankan government against the LTTE.
So, publicly India maintained that it would not give Sri Lanka any offensive weapons.
OPINION :-
1. Bharatham is keeping good relations with Sri Lanka, PM Modiji is taking care of this;
2. Tamil nadu should keep away from its party politics with Srilankan Tamils, as they are SriLankan Nationals, no business with them;
3. Bharatham has keeping good relations with Indian Daispora all over the world, hence Tamilnadu need not to indulge in this to enable their political image;
JAIHIND
VANDEMATARAM
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